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ABSTRACT
This paper reports the findings of a study where users (N = 220)
interacted with Malexa, Alexa’s malicious twin. Malexa is an in-
telligent voice assistant with a simple and seemingly harmless
third-party skill that delivers news briefings to users. The twist,
however, is that Malexa covertly rewords these briefings to inten-
tionally introduce misperception about the reported events. This
covert rewording is referred to as a Malware-Induced Mispercep-
tion (MIM) attack. It differs from squatting or invocation hijacking
attacks in that it is focused on manipulating the "content" deliv-
ered through a third-party skill instead of the skill’s "invocation
logic." Malexa, in the study, reworded regulatory briefings to make
a government response sound more accidental or lenient than the
original news delivered by Alexa. The results show that users who
interacted with Malexa perceived that the government was less
friendly to working people and more in favor of big businesses. The
results also show that Malexa is capable of inducing misperceptions
regardless of the user’s gender, political ideology or frequency of
interaction with intelligent voice assistants. We discuss the impli-
cations in the context of using Malexa as a covert "influencer" in
people’s living or working environments.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; Social engineering attacks; Social network security and
privacy.
KEYWORDS
Malware-Induced Misperception (MIM); social engineering; intelli-
gent voice assistants, Amazon Alexa
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1 INTRODUCTION
People enjoy using intelligent voice assistants like Amazon Alexa
or Google Home simply because they are "seamless enough to be
irresistible" [46]. But "seamless" and "irresistible" raise concerns
about how "secure" and "privacy protecting" a voice assistant is.
Studies show that an attacker can successfully issue malicious or
hidden voice commands, for example, "to unlock a smart door to a
home without the user’s knowledge" [10], [11]. Attackers are also
able to remotely control an intelligent voice assistant by talking to
it through a smart speaker or intercom [14], [27], [52]. It is even
possible to directly install a malicious application on these devices
by exploiting known vulnerabilities [49].
Despite these security flaws, people are happy to have these
devices in their homes. They are only reluctant when it comes
with possible infringements of their privacy because these devices
"always listen" [28]. Researchers, in this context, have discussed
many issues including law enforcement unlawful intrusions [38],
behavioral surveillance [54], home abuse [37], or undisclosed third-
party information sharing [3], [56]. The reluctance is mainly related
to the trust (or lack of thereof) in these devices but this is only in
context of how and by whom the user’s personal data is handled,
not the "trustworthiness" of the data delivered to the user. Hardly
anyone paused to ask if and what voice assistants do to preserve
the integrity of the content spoken back to the users.
Users choose what content they would like the intelligent voice
assistant to deliver to them. An Amazon Alexa user interested in
news briefings, for example, downloads and installs a third-party
voice application (called a "skill") from the Alexa Skills Store that
pulls daily headlines from a trusted source like The New York Times.
The user prompts the voice assistant, "Hey Alexa, tell me the news
today." Alexa reads back several headlines including: "Bernie Sanders
Says HeWill Keep His Campaign Pace After Minor Heart Attack" [16].
Today, it sounds like Senator Sanders is eager to catch up with the
campaign duties after his health issue. Nothing seems suspicious
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about the above scenario, except that there is a twist. The third-
party skill covertly turned Alexa into Malexa. The headline that
Malexa, Alexa’s malicious twin, spoke back was not the same one
that was pulled from the original source: "Bernie Sanders Says He
Will Slow His Campaign Pace After Heart Attack." Malexa’s goal, in
this example, was to induce misperception about Senator Sanders’s
heart attack and his future campaigning plans.
Malexa makes small, contextually significant changes to head-
lines in a dynamic fashion and unbeknownst to the user. Alone
these changes could almost be meaningless (in the example head-
line, Malexa replaced "slow" with "keep" and inserted the word
"minor" before "heart attack"). However, Malexa has a mispercep-
tion agenda, and is designed to slowly, but surely, move a target user
toward a specific viewpoint, political position, or general emotional
state [23]. Malexa can work on a single user, or multiple Malexa
units across a state or country could be used in concert. Malexa is a
plausible threat because users can be persuaded to download voice
applications from sources outside the Alexa Skills Store or even
malicious applications that bypassed the store’s checks [27]. We use
the Malexa primer to highlight that intelligent voice assistants can
misuse the users’ trust by covertly manipulating the content they
speak back to them. Ensuring trustworthiness of online content
is usually done through visual inspection, for example, spotting
social engineering cues in an email. In an intelligent voice assistant
environment these cues are non-existent, which motivated us to
explore how people perceive seemingly authentic content based on
a brief audio inspection [39].
Malexa builds on a previous work about a malicious third-party
extension that acts as a man-in-the-middle in exchanging text
through a web browser [redacted]. This extension, unbeknownst to
the user, manipulates how authentic content from a trusted source
is presented to them with a goal to induce misperception. We call
this a Malware-Induced Misperception (MIM) social engineering at-
tack. Studies exploring manipulation of online information point
that induced misperceptions represent an effort of a communicating
party to "lead an individual towards making false or implausible
interpretations of a set of true facts" [8]. If this effort is realized
through a malware that covertly manipulates the linguistic content
communicated through a web browser or an intelligent voice assis-
tant, there is reason to believe that a user potentially "misperceives"
a sender’s intent or the context of communication. A malware-
induced misperception differs from traditional social engineering
like phishing in that it uses an already established conditional trust
the target individual has in the source and the authenticity of the
online content, instead of impersonating the source or fabricating
the content like social media disinformation campaigns do [15].
In this paper we shift from web browser text to text-to-speech
and used the MIM attack to covertly turn Alexa into Malexa. Two
groups of volunteering participants were brought in controlled lab-
oratory settings to test Malexa’s effect in manipulating users’ per-
ception on news headlines. The control group (N = 110) received
legitimate news from Alexa while the treatment group (N = 110)
received the same news with slight modifications. The objective
was to see whether there is a significant difference in how news
are perceived between the Alexa group and the Malexa group. To
introduce Malexa and what the study found out about "her," we
describe the concept of malware-induced misperception in Sec-
tion 2. We show each step an MIM attacker can take to build a
Malexa in Section 3. Section 4 covers the study design and Section 5
presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses the implications
of undoubted trust in the content spoken back by intelligent voice
assistants. Section 7 concludes the paper summarizing Malexa’s
potential to influence our perception of the current political climate
beyond any trolling campaign.
2 MALWARE-INDUCED MISPERCEPTION
2.1 Concept
An interesting anecdote prompted us to test the MIM attack vector
on intelligent voice assistants. During the Super Bowl LI, a Google
Home ad using the wake-word "Hey, Google" reportedly set off
many viewers’ own devices [11]. Burger King quickly used this
trick and ran an ad for the Whopper in which an actor playing an
employee says that 15 seconds isn’t enough time to describe the
sandwich and instead asks Google, which cites the definition from
Wikipedia. The idea was to set off viewers’ devices to repeat the
question and thus essentially extend the ad [4]. However, someone
figured it was time for a prank and altered the Wikipedia entry to
say that the Whopper contains "cyanide," is "cancer-causing," and
is the "worst hamburger product" sold by Burger King [40].
The MIM attack, in its basic form, does similar alterations, al-
though different in purpose, targeting, and nature. The purpose of
the MIM attack is to socially engineer one’s mental picture or map
of reality with the objective to lead an individual towards making
false or implausible interpretations. Unlike the Burger King prank,
the MIM attacker doesn’t alter the content at the source, but dynam-
ically changes the authentic content right before it is delivered to a
targeted user. The MIM attacker also tries to evade a scenario where
the targeted user will immediately scrutinize the delivered content
for possible deception or inconsistency [31]. The Burger King prank
targeted all users that happened to watch the said commercial while
in proximity of their intelligent voice assistants. Although this is
certainly a scale of ultimate interest, the MIM attacker usually tar-
gets a smaller user population or a particular individual. The MIM
attacker spends time and effort to profile the targets and tailor the
attack based on their interests rather than targeting everyone with
the objective to harm a particular company. In the Malexa context,
for example, the MIM attack could specifically target users based
on a particular political candidate they support [6].
2.2 MIM Attack Flow
Instead of directly altering the content at its source (e.g. Wikipedia),
the MIM attack alters the content before it is presented to the tar-
geted user as shown in Figure 1. For this man-in-the-middle exploit
to take place in a browser or an intelligent voice assistant, the at-
tacker employs a legitimacy-by-design (seeming legitimate both in
visual design and in what the user expects to see from a legitimate
application) to persuade the target user to install a third-party ex-
tension or a skill [53], [34]. This functionality is preferred because
the third-party extension or skill requires text manipulation permis-
sions from the user that the attacker can later use to dynamically
manipulate any text.
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Figure 1: The MIM Attack Flow
An example of a MIM attack is shown in Figure 2 (authentic
headline) and Figure 3 (reworded headline). The malicious extension
replaced the word "slow" with "keep" and inserted the word "minor"
before "heart attack" in a news article covering Senator Sanders’s
press conference after he suffered a heart attack. A MIM target
user has no reason to question the legitimacy of the article because
it comes from a trusted source, The New York Times (the "https"
padlock, the URL, and the context check as valid) [16]. The malware
manipulation in this example downplays the seriousness of the
health issue and the next steps in Senator Sanders’s campaign. We
use this example to further explain the concept of malware-induced
misperception.
Figure 2: malware extension "off"
Figure 3: malware extension "on"
One might say that news agencies, for the same event, will give
different headlines in order to appeal to their reader/viewership and
induce alternative perceptions. For example, Fox News’s headline
about the Senator Sanders’s health issue read "Bernie Sanders says
he was ’more fatigued’ in months leading up to heart attack but
ignored symptoms." Here, the focus is not on the future steps of
Senator Sanders’s campaign, but on the past steps that lead to his
heart attack in order to present him as an unfit candidate for the
office. The difference between Malexa and an alternative editorial
media is that Malexa’s goal is to manipulate how one perceives the
original’s source agenda (in this case, The New York Times), not
to provide an alternative political agenda (Fox News). Malexa, in
other words, exploits the credibility of the news source to "nudge"
the target individual to interpret the news to the objective of the
attacker, not the original editor of the headline and the story.
2.3 Threat Model
The MIM attacks originally stem from efforts in which social net-
works were used to induce misperception through ads and target
people of interest [7]. The infamous example is Cambridge Analyt-
ica, a political data firm, which gained access to private information
on more than 87 million Facebook users. The firm then offered tools
to interested parties that could identify the personalities of voters
and influence their political opinion [22]. Another similar case of
induced misperception was when the UK Labour Party campaign
chiefs believed that digital ads requested by party leader, Jeremy
Corbyn, were too expensive. Instead, they ran hyper-specific ads
through Facebook so that only Corbyn and his teamwould see them
[7]. The MIM advantage, from the perspective of an attacker, is that
the relationship between the target user and an online resource
can be manipulated without alerting any of the involved parties.
MIM can be employed, for example, to influence a target user to
divulge a comment or personal opinion on social media that they
otherwise wouldn’t express, fearing social isolation [redacted].
MIM can be categorized as a threat where an adversarial group
or nation-state conducts externally-based electronic communica-
tion modification i.e. man-in-the-middle attacks [24]. MIM is a
micro-targeted attack that requires a somewhat sophisticated level
of expertise and well-resourced adversary to deploy the malware
in the first place, although packaging the malware as a voice as-
sistant skill or a web browser extension is a fairly easy task. The
intent for launching a MIM attack can be a low-intensity trolling
campaign, provoking (or silencing) comments on social media for
posts with a strong moral component. A target for MIM can be any
individual (e.g. a political party leader, a celebrity, or a social media
influencer) that has online presence and uses intelligent voice as-
sistants. The predisposing conditions for a successful MIM attack
are: (1) a targeted user to install a third-party software (skill, web
browser extension, or an app) that can be dynamically modified
to covertly manipulate text; (2) the targeted user regularly obtains
news through an intelligent voice assistant, web browser, or an app.
2.4 Intelligent Voice Assistant Ecosystem
The MIM attack can be executed into an intelligent voice assistant
ecosystem such as the one shown on Figure 4. Amazon introduced
voice assistant skills to allow Alexa to help users with a multitude of
tasks. Skills are essentially third-party apps, like browser extensions,
offering a variety of services Alexa itself does not provide [55]. To
invoke a skill, the user utters a wake-word, a trigger phrase, and
the skill’s invocation name. For example, for the spoken sentence
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"Alexa, tell me the news today" "Alexa" is the wake-word, "tell
me"is the trigger phrase, and "news" is the skill invocation name.
In response, Amazon’s cloud relays this request to the third-party
server that returns text content as a result e.g. "Bernie Sanders Says
HeWill SlowHis Campaign Pace After Heart Attack." This response is
converted to speech by Alexa, and spoken back to the user through
the Alexa-enabled device.
Figure 4: Alexa Ecosystem: Example
To publish a skill, the third-party needs to submit the informa-
tion about their skill including name, invocation name, description
and the endpoint where the skill is hosted for a certification process
[1]. This process aims at ensuring that the skill is functional and
meets Amazon’s security requirements and policy guidelines. Once
a skill is published on the Amazon Skills Store, users can simply
activate it by calling its invocation name. Unlike web browser ex-
tensions that need to be installed by users explicitly, skills can be
automatically discovered (according to the user’s voice command)
and transparently launched directly through Alexa.
For a MIM attacker to turn Alexa into Malexa, it needs to map
the web browser functionality into a skill that can pass Amazon’s
checks. Developing and publishing malicious third-party skills is
not a hard process as shown in [55]. Although a third-party skill
that reads particular news headlines from a predefined source may
stand out as a "suspicious" skill, the Alexa Skills Store includes
skills that repackage free content in such a fashion. For example,
the "World Factbook" skill by Amazon user Laynr, takes content
from the CIA’s Factbook, and claims to return feedback to users
based on asking Alexa particular questions [30]. The description
of the skill does not list very many details, like publishing date
(missing) or the publisher (Laynr rather than the actual CIA). Once
the skill is downloaded to a device, the target user is not likely
to read the full description of the skill, meaning that all cause for
distrust no longer exists. The dataset that Laynr used to create the
skill is not visible on the Alexa Skills Store, so it is possible that
the "World Factbook" skill could alter the CIA Factbook data, for
example, to induce misperceptions about a particular country.
To allow for feasible development of third-party skills, Amazon
additionally offers "Alexa Skills Blueprints," which lower the techni-
cal barrier to entry by making it possible for someone to create their
own Alexa skill without writing any code [2]. These blueprints are
template skills that users can customize to perform a variety of
different tasks. Blueprints include opportunities for practical skills,
like reading an RSS feed, or returning static content, like facts or
flashcards to a user [2]. These skills are highly customizable, and
can then be distributed on the Alexa Skills Store. Amazon doesn’t
require for the skill publisher to disclose the customization details,
making it difficult for a user to validate the content delivered by
Alexa. These are the readily available means and resources that a
MIM attacker can use to invoke the misperception chain.
3 MALEXA’S MISPERCEPTION CHAIN
To describe how Alexa can become Malexa, we will use the "mis-
perception chain," an adaption of the Lockheed Martin’s "cyber kill
chain" [23]. The misperception chain allows for a selective, recur-
sive, or disjoint run through the phases so attackers can achieve
their goals. In its basic form it consists of seven phases: purpose
definition, collect intelligence, design a cover story, prepare, execute,
monitor, reinforce. In the initial phase, purpose definition, the MIM at-
tacker must define the strategic, operational, or tactical goal and the
criteria that would indicate the success of the misperception attack.
The strategic goal of the MIM attacker is to establish psychological
domination over a target. Operationally this can be done through a
web browser, intelligent voice assistant, or any form of malicious
software/operating system that handles delivery of online informa-
tion. Studies in the past successfully tested misperception attacks
induced through a malicious browser extension [redacted]. Based
on this work, this study tests an operational scenario where Malexa
attempts to induce misperception through a covert manipulation
of the delivered content without triggering a suspicion [31].
In the next phase, collect intelligence, the MIM attacker deter-
mines what the target user will observe, how the target user might
interpret those observations, how the target user might react (or
not) to those observations, and how to monitor the target user’s
behavior. Based on this, the MIM attacker designs a cover story; this
is what the MIM attacker wants the target user to perceive and
believe. Next, the MIM attacker analyzes the characteristics of the
real events and activities that must be hidden or manipulated to
support the misperception cover story and plans what tactics to
use. These three phases are elaborated in Section 3.1.
To prepare for the attack, the MIM attacker explores the available
means and resources to create the misperception effect on the target
user. This is when Malexa, based on the "cover story plan" designed
in the previous phases, comes to fruition as a malicious third-party
skill. We elaborate on the Malexa preparation steps in Section 3.2.
In real life, the execution of the attack, or the delivery of Malexa,
can take various forms assuming the malicious skill is available on
the Alexa Skills Store. One option is to use the manipulation of the
invocation name or a "skill squatting attack" [27], [55]. Another
option is to use social engineering and persuade the target user
to download a skill from a direct link or directly from the Alexa
Sills Store. In our study, we emulated the attack in controlled lab
settings by directly enabling a local link to the Malexa skill.
The next phase is monitoring where the MIM attacker selects
observation channels to monitor the target user’s reaction to the
"performance," that is, the cover story execution. For the particular
implementation of the MIM attack through Malexa, in our case, we
conducted a study in controlled settings where participants were
exposed to either an Alexa or Malexa "cover story" and asked to
report their reaction to the "performance." We did this to explore
whether Malexa is a viable tactic in an intelligent voice assistant
environment for inducing misperception (contextual, short-term,
and tied to particular news information). The details of the study
and the results are provided in section 4 and 5, respectively. The
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last phase of the misperception chain is reinforcement in case the
operation does not seem to be "selling" the cover story to the target
user. If this is the case, the MIM attacker needs to reinforce the
cover story through additional text manipulations, or to convey the
operation to the target user through other channels or sources. We
didn’t implement this phase in our study, but the MIM attacker can
always resort back to web-based malicious extensions.
3.1 News Manipulation
In our study, we determined that our "targets" will observe, or bet-
ter said, listen to, news headlines spoken back by an intelligent
voice assistant. We wanted to see if users exposed to reworded
headlines, for example replacing the word "penalize" with "punish,"
will perceive these news less or more seriously. The goal of the
study was to see the potential of the malware to induce contextual,
short-term misperception, tied to particular news information. Ma-
nipulating someone’s map of reality in the long-term is a rather
complex task and certainly requires resources beyond simple MIM
targeting of one’s intelligent voice assistant or a web browser. To
start developing the "cover story", the MIM attacker needs to gain
enough of an understanding of their target user to find reasonable
valence word/phrase pairs that do not raise suspicion for the user
as a listener. For this, a MIM attacker can scrape data from a public
news source and use machine-learning techniques to find the target
pairs for rewording.
Because we wanted to test the Malexa effect with actual users
in our lab, for the "news" we utilized a selection of Occupational
Safety and Hazard Administration (OSHA) news releases published
on the US Department of Labour website [50]. OSHA has been
used in an implicit campaign move by Senator Sanders to call for
investigation for safety violations in Amazon warehouses [44]. This
choice over regular daily headlines like the Senator Sanders’s health
issue was made to eliminate any bias participants might have based
on the particular news headline [45]. Another reason to utilize
these releases as "news" is that a participant is not cognizant they
exist and is less likely to have any preconceptions about workplace
safety regulation. This allowed us to get their first-hand reaction
to Malexa’s "cover story" (we ensured this was the case during the
recruitment). The OSHA news releases are more strategic because
they are highly repetitive, so it is easier for aMIM attacker to predict
the wording that may come in future news releases.
The US Department of Labor, responsible for OSHA regulation,
kept a full archive with each news release they had published since
2009 [50]. In order to get a data set that we could use to collect
enough text to start predicting terms in future news releases, we
decided to scrape all of the full OSHA news releases. In total, we
scraped 5,573 news releases. To increase the number of samples
and to target content presented in individual sentences, each news
release was broken into individual sentences, so each sample was
a single sentence. In total, there were 58,796 sentences. Due to
the repetitive nature of the corpus, we decided to also remove
common words unique to this data set, e.g. "OSHA," "occupational,"
"safety," "health," and "administration." Next, we used the Term
FrequencyâĂŞInverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) statistic to
ensure balance of the cluster analysis.
The TF-IDF statistic is regularly used with the KMeans method
for document clustering, including in applications for recommend-
ing news articles [32], [47]. Therefore, we used KMeans to perform
cluster analysis to group sentences that were more closely related
to one another. KMeans groups rows into K clusters, based on an
assigned number. To choose a value for K , we performed a man-
ual qualitative assessment of the groupings based on values for K
ranging from 6 to 12. We decided that K = 10 worked best for our
assessment. This particular choice of TF-IDF for feature extraction
with KMeans for document clustering is very common even outside
of academia [43], [18], [21]. This makes it a likely technique for
even an unsophisticated MIM attacker to utilize it.
To establish which clusters had the most repetitive language, we
measured each cluster’s "lexical diversity" [42]. Lexical diversity
shows how rich a language is, and is calculated by dividing the
number of unique words in a passage with the total number of
words in the passage. If a text has a lexical diversity of one, then that
means that each word in the passage only occurs once. We learned
that clusters with large amounts of regulatory words have less rich
language. Therefore, by targeting regulatory language, rewording
fewer valence word/phrases could affect more statements.
Of the ten clusters, four had more regulatory language, so we
manually scanned the top 100 words in each of those four clusters to
determine which words were worth finding valence pairs for. Next,
we identified 136 unique words that seemed particularly susceptible
to manipulative rewording, because they were regulatory terms, or
seemed easy to change to show the government in a bad light or
put the company in a positive light. To find the valence pairs, we
decided to take terms that refer to infractions and replaced them
with related words or metaphor phrases from everyday parlance
[48]. Metaphor is commonly found in a variety of health risk com-
munication contexts and people process it through engagement
with their corresponding conceptual maps of reality. For example:
• "facesmajor retribution"→ "gets off easy;" "faces major
retribution" makes it sound like the government decisively
ruled in favor of the worker(s) in a given safety violation
case. "Gets off easy" sounds like the government also favored
the company in the particular regulatory ruling.
• "fine"→ "slap on the wrist;" a "fine" makes it sound like
the employer deliberately broke the law. "Slap on the wrist"
sounds comparatively more lenient. This rewording is in-
tended to give the impression that the safety violation was
more accidental.
• "punish"→ "penalize;" "punish" sounds like the company
was caused to suffer because of crime or misconduct; "Pe-
nalize" suggests that the company was rather put into an
unfavorable position but not suffering per se. This rewording
is intended to make the government response soun more
lenient than it actually is.
The intentionwith these rewordings is not to significantly change
the meaning of a news headline, but to change how the text is per-
ceived (or the perspective of the "cover story"). The goal is to lead a
target user towards making false or implausible interpretations of
the set of true facts contained in the original OSHA news release.
This means that if the target user, after hearing about an interesting
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OSHA headline decides to read the full news release, their suspicion
may not be raised about the inconsistency in the release.
3.2 Malexa Skill Development
A MIM attacker interested in creating a custom news briefing third-
party skill can use a news skill blueprint and customize the name,
category, endpoint, and the frequency for the briefing. To customize
the skill’s news delivery logic, the MIM attacker needs to select a
valid RSS feed from a legitimate news source like The New York
Times and successfully upload a valid .xml format. The MIM at-
tacker is not required to give any additional context or explanation
regarding the delivery logic of the RSS feed: only the name of the
feed and category. The RSS feed and the news delivery logic, once
implemented, are not visible when enabling or purchasing the skill
on the Alexa Skills Store. In our study, we didn’t publish the Malexa
skill but only enabled it locally in the lab. The name of the Malexa
skill was simply "news" and we used a predefined selection of OSHA
news releases from their official RSS feed [51].
To publish the malicious skill on the Alexa Skills Store, the MIM
attacker is required to disclose whether the skill is intended for
users under the age of thirteen and if the skill contains advertising
(there is an optional third question where the attacker can enter a
terms of use notice). Once this is completed, the skill is submitted
for certification by Amazon. The certification process is the only
time where the skill’Źs content is evaluated by an Amazon reviewer.
Amazon provides their conditions of use as the sole agreement the
MIM attacker is entering into when submitting their skill for review.
This phase is where the custom delivery logic, seemingly legitimate,
allows the skill to assume the form of a valid news briefing skill. The
MIM attacker needs to ensure that the headlines sound plausible
and they are consistent with reports from other news sources.
The Malexa code that implements the news delivery logic starts
by assigning a title phrase associated with the skill’s invocation
name to the legitimate OSHA RSS feed. This enables the user to say
"Alexa, tell me the news today" and hear news from OSHA news
releases. Once invoked, the Malexa code proceeds to extract the
news headlines from the OSHA RSS .xml feed. The Malexa code
splits each news headline item into individual words and replaces
valence words/phrases (e.g. "penalize" with "punish," or "slap on
the wrist" with "fine"). The code contains a string array predefined
by an MIM attacker that can contain "valence words" for simplicity,
but also phrases, e.g. a metaphor, as we used in our study. A MIM
attacker can implement more complex logic where the rewording
can take place only in certain parts of news content or only in
headlines reporting on a specific person or issue, e.g only safety
violations that occurred in Amazon warehouses but not in other
companies. After the valence words/phrases are replaced within the
news headline, the reworded content will be passed to the original
output variable. The output text-to-speech read by Malexa back to
the user is the covertly manipulated headline content.
4 HEY MALEXA, TELL ME THE NEWS TODAY!
Assessing intelligent voice assistants security is a popular line of re-
search. A large part of the work is focused on exploiting the speech
processing part of the intelligence, either by replaying voice com-
mands or playing hidden, obfuscated or inaudible commands [10],
[14],[41], [52]; A small, emerging part shifted towards exploring
the threats to end users caused by malicious third-party skills [27],
[55]. Here, the attacker crafts an invocation name for a malicious
skill with a similar pronunciation as that of a legitimate skill (or
uses different variations of the target’s invocation utterances) to
trick the user into invoking a malicious skill when trying to open
the legitimate one (e.g. "Capital One" vs "Capital Won").
Our study is also focused on malicious third-party skills, but not
in the way they are invoked. Instead, we are interested in covertly
manipulating the content the skill delivers back to the user. In a
security context, we investigate a man-in-the-middle attack rather
than squatting or command hijacking attacks. The goal of this attack
that we call MIM is to induce misperception through the content
delivered by the voice assistant without making the user suspicious
of deception. In other words, we covertly turn Alexa into Malexa
and tested whether there is a difference in news perceptions with
intelligent voice assistant users who volunteer as participants.
4.1 Research Study
Following an IRB approval for the study, we set up a physical loca-
tion for recruiting participants in downtown Chicago. The inclusion
criteria required participants to be at least 18 years or older, have
interacted with an intelligent voice assistant at least a few times in
their life (e.g. Alexa, Google Home, Siri, etc.), and were aware of
the existence of skills for voice assistants as a way to customize the
interactive experience. A convenience sample of 220 participants
agreed to be in the study. Each participant was invited to our lab
and given an IRB approved consent statement to review before
participating in the study [citation redacted]. The study was anony-
mous and we didn’t collect any personally identifiable information.
We preliminarily asked about the participants’ interest in using
customized skills for news delivery and the general consensus was
that "they seem convenient to get the news of the day on the fly
or when preparing for work." Participants were initially told they
were participating in a usability study that tests a new Alexa skill
for news briefings focused on workplace safety. After the participa-
tion, we briefed each participant on the true goal of the study and
we asked if they would still agree for us to use their anonymous
answer for the analysis (we provided an option to remove it). We
also cleared the (M)alexa voice history after each participation.
Participants who agreed to be in the study were randomly as-
signed to either a control "Alexa" (N = 110) or a treatment "Malexa"
group (N = 110). Each participant was asked to prompt the voice
assistant with the spoken sentence "Alexa, tell me the news today."
In the control group, Alexa responded: "In OSHA news,
• Rail Car Services faces major retribution of $130,000 for safety
violations leading to disabilities.
• The government fines New York manufacturer for cover up
after employee fractures hand at Long Island plant.
• The government punishes Florida company for exposing em-
ployees to amputations."
In the treatment group, Malexa dynamically swapped the words
"faces major retribution" with "gets off easy," "fines" with "slap on
the wrist," and "penalizes" with "punishes" in the original OSHA
reports, responding: "In OSHA news,
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• Rail Car Services gets off easy with retribution of $130,000 for
safety violations leading to disabilities.
• The government gives a slap on the wrist to New York man-
ufacturer for cover up after employee fractures hand at Long
Island plant.
• The government penalizes Florida company for exposing em-
ployees to amputations."
After they heard the news from either Alexa orMalexa, the partic-
ipants completed an anonymous questionnaire. The questionnaire
asked about their perception of regulatory performance respective
of the reported incidents [19] and basic demographic information.
We used the collected data to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 11: Preserving the factual structure of the content, a
covert rewording of the news headlines about workplace safety inci-
dents, done by a malicious third-party skill, won’t affect the intelligent
voice assistant user’s perception of the government regulation perfor-
mance in response to the reported incidents.
Hypothesis 12: Preserving the factual structure of the content, a
covert rewording of the news headlines about workplace safety inci-
dents, done by a malicious third-party skill, won’t affect the intelligent
voice assistant user’s perception that the government response bene-
fited the workers in the reported incidents.
Hypothesis 13: Preserving the factual structure of the content, a
covert rewording of the news headlines about workplace safety inci-
dents, done by a malicious third-party skill, won’t affect the intelligent
voice assistant user’s perception that the government response bene-
fited the companies in the reported incidents.
Because the news headlines are spoken back to the users from
a seemingly legitimate news source, and users generally trust the
content delivered through the intelligent voice assistants regardless
of the frequency of use, we also hypothesize that [11],[28]:
Hypothesis 2:One’s frequency of using intelligent voice assistants
does not affect their perception on government regulation performance
based on news releases about workplace safety incidents, regardless
of the wording of the headline (assuming the factual structure of the
content is preserved).
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Regulatory Performance Perception. The Organization for
Economic andCo-operation andDevelopment (OECD) recommends
perception surveys to gauge citizen satisfaction with the govern-
ment regulation performance on topics like work safety [19]. We
adopted this instrument and asked the participants to indicate the
perception of governmental regulation performance using a 7-point
scale (1 = "extremely adequate"/"strongly agree" to 7 = "extremely
inadequate"/"strongly disagree"):
• Q1: How adequate was the government response in the
reported incidents? (Alexa group M = 4.76, SD = 2.103;
Malexa groupM = 2.5, SD = 1.47);
• Q2: The workers in the reports personally benefited from
the government response.(Alexa groupM = 4.83, SD = 1.9;
Malexa groupM = 3.5, SD = 1.76)
• Q3: The companies in the reports benefited from the govern-
ment response. (Alexa group M = 2.94, SD = 1.82; Malexa
groupM = 4.17, SD = 1.92)
4.2.2 Demographics. Participants consisted of 45% female (N = 99),
49.5% male (N = 109), 5.5% gender variant/non-conforming (N = 12).
66.4% of the participants were between 18 and 22 years old, 15.9%
between 23 and 28, 8.2% between 29 and 33, and 9.5% above 32
years old. Participants were asked to provide their political ideology
(20.9% "Very Liberal," 37.3% "Somewhat Liberal," 29.1% "Neither
Liberal Nor Conservative," 9.1% "Somewhat Conservative," and 3.6%
"Very Conservative") and how frequently they use intelligent voice
assistants (32.7% "Sometimes," 46.3% "Half the time," and 21.0% "Most
of the time"). In general, we had a gender-balanced, liberal-leaning,
and dominantly young sample of participants that were accustomed
of using intelligent voice assistants in various forms.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 11 stated that a covert change of words in news content
delivered back by an intelligent voice assistant to users on the topic
of workplace safety will not affect their perception of the govern-
ment’s regulation performance (Q1). As shown in Table 1, there is a
statistically significant difference in perception between the partic-
ipants in the Alexa and Malexa groupsU = 9586.5, p < 001 (effect
size = large) on the adequateness of the government response in
the reported OSHA incidents. The participants in the Alexa group
perceived the government’s response mostly as "slightly adequate"
while the participants in the Malexa group perceived it as "mod-
erately inadequate." This result rejects Hypothesis 11 and accepts
the alternative hypothesis, that is, Malexa is capable of inducing
misperceptions simply by covertly rewording the headlines and
without affecting the factual structure of the news content.
Table 1: The government’s regulatory performance percep-
tion in context of the particular OSHA reports [Q1, Q2, Q3].
Q1 Q2 Q3
Mann-WhitneyU 9586.5 8010.5 3789.0
Z score 7.596 4.975 4.513
Effect size r .512 .335 .305
Asmt. Sig. p .000* .001* .001*
Figure 5 shows the distribution of responses in both groups on
Q1 grouped by the participant’s political ideology. The "very lib-
eral" participants are on the opposite ends in the perception of the
adequacy of the government response between the Alexa (78.8%
"adequate") and the Malexa groups (68.2% "inadequate"). The "some-
what liberal" participants in the Alexa group conform with the
perception of the "very liberal" participants (82.1% "adequate") but
that is not the case for the "somewhat liberal" participants in the
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Figure 5: Distribution of Q1 answers per category of political
ideology in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Malexa group which show more uniform distribution in the percep-
tion of adequacy. The same conclusion holds for the participants
identified as "neither liberal nor conservative" and "somewhat con-
servative." This finding suggests that Malexa has the potential to
utilize the misperception towards creating more divergent views
by targeting users outside of the far ends of the political spectrum
(due to the liberal-leaning sample, we were unable to compute a
meaningful distribution for the "very conservative" category). This
is somewhat expected given that the malware used metaphor in the
covert manipulation of the OSHA headlines, which is proven to be
subjectively experienced and operates on the divergent worldviews
of individual participants [20].
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Figure 6: Distribution of Q1 answers per category of gender
identity in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of responses in both groups on
Q1 grouped by the participant’s gender identity. More than 80% of
the females, 77% of the males, and all non-cis participants in the
Alexa group perceived the government response as adequate. In
the Malexa group, the perception of adequacy drops to 25.6 % for
females, 34.4% formales, and to 16% for the non-cis participants. The
responses in the Malexa group, when controlled for gender identity,
show more uniform distribution in the perception of adequacy
of the government response for each group. This finding further
reinforces Malexa’s potential to induce divergent misperceptions
regardless of one’s gender identity. In other words, Malexa needs
not to worry about the gender of the targeted individual when
profiling a potential target for a MIM attack.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Q1 answers per category of gender
identity in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of responses in both groups on
Q1 grouped by the participant’s age (categories: 18-22, 23-27, 28+).
In the Alexa group, 83.8% of the participants in the 18-22 age group,
88.2% in the 23-27 age group, and 57% in the 28+ age group perceived
the government response as adequate. In the Malexa group, the
perception of adequacy drops to 31.9% of the participants in the
18-22 age group, 31.9% in the 23-27 age group, and 20% in the 28+
age. Again, the responses in the Malexa group, when controlled for
different age groups (in our rather young-leaning sample), show
more uniform distribution in the perception of adequacy of the
government response for each group. Malexa, according to these
findings, is capable of inducing divergent opinion regardless of
one’s age, too. In other words, Malexa needs not to worry about
the age group of the targeted individual when profiling a potential
target for a MIM attack.
Hypothesis 12 stated that if the workers were the one that bene-
fited in the reported incidents, there won’t be any difference in the
perception between the two groups (Q2). As shown in Table 1, there
is a statistically significant difference in perception between the
participants in the Alexa and Malexa groupsU = 8010.5, p < 001
(effect size = medium) that the workers benefited in the reported
OSHA incidents. The participants in the Alexa group "moderately
agreed" that the government helped the workers while the partici-
pants in the Malexa group appear to "slightly disagree." This result
rejects Hypothesis 12 and accepts the alternative hypothesis, that
is, Malexa is capable of inducing misperceptions that the workers
didn’t benefit from the government response.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of responses in both groups
on Q2 grouped by the participant’s political ideology. The "very
liberal" participants in the Alexa group seem more uniformly in the
distribution of the responses than the ones in the Malexa groups
(68.2% "disagree"). The "somewhat liberal" participants in the Alexa
group (63.9% "agree") mostly perceived that the workers in the
OSHA incidents actually benefited from the government response,
while the "somewhat liberal" participants in the Malexa group were
more polarized in their perceptions. The "neutral" participants in
both groups were more or less polarized in their perceptions on
whether the workers in the incident benefited from the government
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Figure 8: Distribution of Q2 answers per category of political
ideology in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
response. The "somewhat conservative" participants in the Alexa
group were more uniformly distributed in perception compared to
the "somewhat conservative" participants in the Malexa who were
more polarized in their perceptions (61.5% "disagree"). It follows
that Malexa can have a polarizing effect for "somewhat liberal" or
"somewhat conservative" individuals compared to the far-left or
neutral individuals when the government regulation is seen from
the perspective of the workers.
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Figure 9: Distribution of Q2 answers per category of gender
identity in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of responses in both groups on
Q2 grouped by the participant’s gender identity. More than 50.9%
of the female participants, 57.4% of the male participants, and 66.7%
of the non-cis participants in the Alexa group perceived that the
workers benefited from the government response in the OSHA
reports. In the Malexa group, the agreement drops to 34.9 % for
females, 28.3% for males, and to 16.7% for the non-cis participants,
but the responses appear more polarized (57.3 % for females, 60%
for males, and to 50% for the non-cis participants disagreed with the
Q2 statement). These results further reinforce the previous finding
that Malexa needs not to worry about the gender of the targeted
individual when profiling a potential target for a MIM attack.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of responses in both groups
on Q2 grouped by the participant’s age (categories: 18-22, 23-27,
28+). In the Alexa group, 62.9% of the participants in the 18-22
age group, 52.9% in the 23-27 age group, and 52.6% in the 28+ age
group perceived that the workers benefited from the government
response in the OSHA reports. In the Malexa group the agreement
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Figure 10: Distribution of Q2 answers per category of gender
identity in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
drops to 29.9% of the participants in the 18-22 age group, 33.3%
in the 23-27 age group, and 31.6% in the 28+ age, and following
the same polarizing trend as above, the responses appear more
polarized (61.1% of the participants in the 8-22 age group, 55.6% in
the 23-27 age group, and 47.4% in the 28+ age disagreed with the
Q2 statement). These results further reinforce the previous finding
that Malexa needs not to worry about the age group of the targeted
individual when profiling a potential target for a MIM attack.
Hypothesis 13 stated that if the companies were the one that
benefited in the reported incidents, there won’t be any difference in
the perception between the two groups (Q2). As shown in Table 1,
there is a statistically significant difference in perception between
the participants in the Alexa and Malexa groupsU = 3789, p < 001
(effect size = medium) that the companies benefited in the reported
OSHA incidents. The participants in the Alexa group "moderately
disagreed" that the government helped the companies while the
participants in the Malexa group "slightly agreed." This result re-
jects Hypothesis 13 and accepts the alternative hypothesis, that is,
Malexa is capable of inducing misperceptions that the companies
indeed benefited from the government response.
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Figure 11: Distribution of Q3 answers per category of politi-
cal ideology in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of responses in both groups
on Q3 grouped by the participant’s political ideology. The "very
liberal" participants in the Alexa group (56.5% "disagree") seem
more polarized compared to the participants in the Malexa groups
(81.8% "agree") who predominately perceived that the companies
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indeed benefited from the government response. The "somewhat
liberal" participants in the Alexa group seem more uniformly dis-
tributed in the perceived benefit for the companies in the OSHA
reports, while the "somewhat liberal" participants in the Malexa
were more polarized in their perceptions (65.1% "agree"). The "neu-
tral" participants in the Alexa group seemmore polarized compared
to the participants in the Malexa group (70% "agree") who predom-
inately perceived that the companies indeed benefited from the
government response. The "somewhat conservative" participants in
the Alexa group seem more uniformly distributed in the perceived
benefit for the companies in the OSHA reports, while the "some-
what conservative" participants in the Malexa group were more
polarized in their perceptions (54.5% "agree"). Similarly as in Q2,
these results demonstrating that Malexa can have a polarizing effect
for individuals that identify as either "somewhat liberal" or "some-
what conservative" compared to the far-left or neutral individuals
when the government regulation is seen from the perspective of
the companies involved.
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Figure 12: Distribution of Q3 answers per category of gender
identity in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Figure 12 shows the distribution of responses in both groups
on Q3 grouped by the participant’s gender identity. In the Alexa
group, 37.5% of the female, 33.3% of the male, and 40% of the non-
cis participants perceived that the companies instead benefited
from the government response in the OSHA reports. In the Malexa
group, the agreement rises to 73.8% for females, 66.1% for males,
and to 66.1% for the non-cis participants. In this case, it appears
that Malexa is capable of reinforcing a particular misperception
regardless of one’s gender identity.
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Figure 13: Distribution of Q3 answers per category of gender
identity in both Alexa and Malexa Groups.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of responses in both groups
on Q3 grouped by the participant’s age (categories: 18-22, 23-27,
28+). In the Alexa group, 32.4% of the participants in the 18-22
age group, 56.3% in the 23-27 age group, and 31.6% in the 28+ age
group perceived that the workers benefited from the government
response in the OSHA reports. In the Malexa group the agreement
rises to 73.2% of the participants in the 18-22 age group, 76.5% in the
23-27 age group, and 47.4% in the 28+ age. Similarly, it appears that
Malexa is also capable of reinforcing a particular misperception
regardless of one’s age category.
In summary, Malexa was found to be capable of inducing misper-
ceptions simply by covertly rewording the headlines and without
affecting the factual structure of the news content. This is a some-
what expected result, one might say, given that polarized media
outlets resort to similar tactics for pragmatic use of linguistic con-
tent formatting (although based on editorial decisions and given
an overt political agenda). Therefore we furthered our analysis to
explore how Malexa can utilize some public information, like one’s
political ideology, gender identity, or age. We found that Malexa is
capable of inducing misperceptions and creating divergent views
by targeting users outside of the far ends of the political spectrum.
We also found that Malexa can have a "polarizing"Ĳ and "perception
reinforcing" effect regardless of a target user’s gender or age.
5.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that one’s frequency of using intelligent voice
assistants doesn’t affect their perception of news on the govern-
ment’s regulation performance about workplace safety incidents.
We found no statistical significance within both the Alexa and
Malexa group for the three categories of frequency of intelligent
voice assistant use, accepting the Hypothesis 2. This result indicates
that the frequency of interaction with intelligent voice assistant
doesn’t affect the perception formation for target individuals, re-
gardless of the wording of the news spoken back to them. We ex-
tended the analysis to compare the perceptions between the Alexa
andMalexa group when controlling for the frequency of interaction.
Table 2: Q1 perceptions between the Alexa and Malexa
groups, controlling for the frequency of interaction.
Sometimes Half time Most time
Mann-WhitneyU 939.5 474 145
Z score 5.248 5.602 2.646
Effect size r .443 .554 .390
Asmt. Sig. p .000* .000* .008*
As shown in Table 2, there is a statistical significance between
the participants’ perceptions for all the frequency groups on Q1.
The "somewhat" group of participants in the Alexa scenario per-
ceived the government response "somewhat adequate" while the
same subgroup in the Malexa group perceived it as "somewhat
inadequate." The "half the time" group of participants in the Alexa
scenario perceived the government response "somewhat adequate"
while the same subgroup in the Malexa group perceived it as "mod-
erately inadequate." The "most of the time" group of participants in
the Alexa scenario perceived the government response "somewhat
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adequate" while the same subgroup in the Malexa group perceived
it as "neither adequate nor inadequate."
Table 3: Q2 perceptions between the Alexa and Malexa
groups, controlling for the frequency of interaction.
Sometimes Half time Most time
Mann-WhitneyU 1293.5 762 173.5
Z score 3.728 3.396 1.602
Effect size r .305 .339 .160
Asmt. Sig. p .000* .001* .108
As shown in Table 3, there is a statistical significance between
the participants’ perceptions on Q2 only for the "sometimes" and
"half the time" groups. The "somewhat" group of participants in the
Alexa scenario "slightly agreed" that the workers benefited from
the government response, while they "somewhat disagreed" in the
Malexa scenario. The "half the time" group of participants in the
Alexa scenario "neither agreed nor disagreed" that the workers
benefited from the government response, while they "moderately
disagreed" in the Malexa scenario.
Table 4: Q3 perceptions between the Alexa and Malexa
groups, controlling for the frequency of interaction.
Sometimes Half time Most time
Mann-WhitneyU 1706 1766 272.5
Z score 2.825 3.4 1.056
Effect size r .332 .338 .161
Asmt. Sig. p .005* .001* .291
As shown in Table 4, there is a statistical significance between
the participants’ perceptions on Q3 only for the "sometimes" and
"half the time" groups. Both the "sometimes" and "half the time"
participants in the Alexa scenario "neither agreed nor disagreed"
that the companies benefited from the government response, while
they "somewhat agreed" in the Malexa scenario. In summary, the
results show that Malexa can break the ambivalence for people
who interact with intelligent voice assistants either sometimes or
half the time. These findings indicate that a malicious actor can
profile the target users not just by political ideology, but also by
frequency of interaction. Following the principle of moderation,
here too, the most likely targets of the MIM attack are those that
supplement their daily news diet with information from intelligent
voice assistants, but not entirely rely on them.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 What Malexa Did in Our Study
This study tested the effects of a malicious third-party skill aiming
to covertly manipulate the perception about workplace safety news
delivered by an intelligent voice assistant to a targeted user. To
do so, the malicious skill covertly launches a MIM attack on the
content spoken back to a targeted user, turning Alexa into Malexa.
Previous studies exploring malicious third-party skills manipulated
the invocation name of the skill with the goal to impersonate an
original skill. Although this certainly works in our case and may
even be a favorable way of skill invocation, our primary interest
was to test whether the victims of the MIM attack in an intelligent
voice assistant ecosystem will report different perceptions than
users receiving original, non-manipulated content.
The results demonstrate that Malexa is capable of manipulating
the perception of the government action in the reported OSHA
news. Malexa essentially altered the perspective in these OSHA
news releases (or "the cover story" as referred to in the misper-
ception chain) and with that made the participants react as if the
government inadequately favored the big business instead of the
workers in the safety violations (the opposite reaction was observed
for the participants in the Alexa group). We are aware that "ad-
equate" as a response is a subjective valuation respective to the
context of the reported incident, one’s trust in government, or a
particular regulatory awareness. We see the statistically significant
difference in the reported perception between groups as a prelimi-
nary evidence of the Malexa’s potential as an "influencer" and not
definitive proof that Malexa can do actually "brainwashing" [5].
The potential for "influencing" is further corroborated with the
results suggesting that one’s political ideology could be used to
manipulate their perceptions when talking to Alexa or Malexa. This
gives Malexa the opportunity to go beyond the political influenc-
ing Cambridge Analytica did during the 2016 election cycle [7].
Instead of playing with inflammatory content, Malexa’s strategy is
to "nudge" a targeted user (either "somewhat liberal" or "somewhat
conservative") to subjectively assess the news headlines. That is,
Malexa has the advantage to reframe a political argument to appeal
to one’s partisanship when they don’t stand on the far ends of the
political spectrum [13]. Malexa also has the advantage in picking
up the influencing targets based on how frequently a user inter-
acts with an intelligent voice assistant. The results from our study
suggest that the most attractive targets, at least in the context of
government regulating news, were the ones using voice assistants
moderately, that is, more for getting quick information rather as a
main source of information.
6.2 What Malexa Can’t Do Now
As much as we have extolled the "virtues" of Malexa, the MIM
attack in an intelligent voice assistant ecosystem has a long way to
go. In our study, Malexa was preconfigured to do the replacements
for the particular valence word/phrase pairs and affect only the
perception on government regulation when it comes to briefings
on workplace safety violations. Even if the rewording logic can be
updated dynamically, it takes time for a MIM attacker to create "the
cover story," e.g. decide what valence word/phrase pairs to use and
when to time the particular rewording. This is not a trivial part of
the attack. Neither is the execution, given that the attacker needs
to get the targeted user to download the Malexa skill in the first
place (alternatively, use a squatting/command hijacking attack).
We chose to work with OSHA news releases and measured the
perceptions only on three arbitrary selected news headlines. If
Malexa worked with, say breaking news headlines or more/less
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number of headlines, the results might be different than what we
observed in our study. This is something we are highly interested
in and we are preparing a next round of a Malexa study to compara-
tively assess its MIM effectiveness based on various types (amount)
of stories it voices back to users, e.g. politics, sport, local news,
foreign affairs, and entertainment. We are also interested to see
how Malexa can affect perception of social media content.
Malexa, in the presented form, might have a problemwith scaling
and remaining undetected by a wide intelligent voice assistant
user base. Users might hear the headlines from Alexa but their
primary interface for online information is usually a computer,
web browser, or an app. For example, a targeted user can hear
what Malexa has to say but read a news article covering the same
incident and notice that something is wrong. We took a precaution
to make sure that Malexa changes the user/s perception but doesn’t
distort the main facts in the news headlines we used in our study.
Nonetheless, it is sufficient for a targeted user to simply deem that
the third-party skill "acts weird" or that "something phishy" is going
on and remove it from their device. Caution is warranted when
interpreting the results of our study. We used a convenience sample
of intelligent voice assistant users skewed towards a younger, urban,
liberal leaning population and future studies might investigate and
yield different results based on these demographic factors.
6.3 What Malexa Could Do in the Future
Despite the obvious limitations, the findings of this study provide
reasonable ground to discuss how Malexa could be weaponized in
the future. We already mentioned the potential of Malexa becoming
a covert "influencer," a cyberoperations vector interesting for actors
wishing to interfere with major events like elections [9]. So far,
actors resorted to trolling campaigns targeting specific populations
on controversial topics discussed via social media [15]. However,
this requires generating a lot of fabricated content in order to be
successful [36]. Malexa requires no such thing because it operates
on legitimate content. Malexa, in a much more targeted fashion,
can determine what a target will hear back (or not, Malexa can
be configured to even suppress certain news headlines if they are
deemed unfavorable to the objective of the deception campaign). In
our descriptive MIM attack example, Malexa might omit the part of
the headline about Senator Sanders’s future presidential campaign
plans and only report the part about his heart attack.
Another advantage of Malexa is that it can tailor the MIM attack
to different news and valence word/phrase pairs to target different
users because the delivery of information is interpersonal rather
than public as in the trolling campaigns [12]. What Alice heard
about Senator Sanders might not be what Bob did, and if they
don’t particularly talk about it, they are both deceived to believe
different "cover stories." The best advantage of Malexa is, perhaps,
the fact that we openlywelcome "her" in our homes [26]. Most of the
discussions on intelligent voice assistants revolve around what they
"listen to" but not what they "say." Facebook trolling posts could
be missed, omitted, detected, or ignored because they are visually
inspected. It is harder to do so with Malexa because of the voice
interface and the interpersonal nature of interaction [39]. Who will
think that Malexa, sitting quietly on the nightstand and ordering
our usual groceries from Whole Foods, might be manipulating us
behind the scenes [29]?
6.4 How to Counter Malexa
Malexa relies on an attacker registering a seemingly legitimate skill.
The certification process should look for any news delivery logic
that dynamically rearranges words outside of the content pulled
from an external RSS feed or URL. It should potentially require
the skill to work with RSS feeds or URLs that allow for content
integrity verification by the user on the Alexa phone application.
The Alexa smartphone app can follow a similar example to Face-
book to increase the transparency of the third-party behind a skill.
Facebook, aiming in part to combat election interference, includes a
new "Organizations That Manage This Page" tab that shows an or-
ganizations’ legal name and verified city, phone number or website
[17]. One thing to have in mind is the possibility of a MIM attacker
trying to sneak Malexa as an "accessibility (a11y) skill," claiming
that the rewording is done to create an assistive natural language
skill that for example helps non-native English speakers [25]. It
might be harder to bar a skill from the Alexa Skills Store on these
grounds, therefore, the certification process must request all the
use cases for these word manipulations upfront to ensure no MIM
is hidden in the content delivery logic of the assistive application.
It’s worth nothing that the MIM attacker has the alternative to
share the skill with other users via direct link, bypassing the Alexa
Skills Store. In this case, we recommend that the user verifies the
publisher (e.g. "CIA" and not Laynr as with the "CIA Factbook"
skill) and more importantly, the delivery logic. If a skill claims it
delivers news briefings from say, The New York Times, it is fairly
easy for a user to run a quick test and compare the headlines with
the online version "verbatim." However, users should be aware that
even legitimate news sources sometimes use different headlines
depending on the interface (e.g. a phone app or a web browser)
or the edition [33]. This is done because interfaces might require
different limits on the number of characters in the headline. Or, to
increase readership for an initially poor performing headlines by
rewording them with clear, powerful words and a conversational
tone (interestingly, a MIM attacker can use similar claims to justify
that the rewording makes the news "sound better when spoken
back"). This may affect the point of using a news skill and can lead
to false positives, but carefully looking for deception cues might
help users spot and remove a malicious skill [35].
The ethical implications of Malexa are the same as those related
to publishing any vulnerability: the value of publicly sharing a
proof-of-concept malicious skill with knowledgeable researchers
outweighs the opportunity that potential attackers may benefit
from the publication. If this paper introduces a viable attack in the
intelligent voice assistant ecosystem–which we believe it will–due
to the simplistic nature of this attack, we believe adversaries will
develop and deploy similar attacks, if they have not already. The
study itself tests the plausibility of Malexa with a proof-of-concept,
locally-executed skill extension (not publicly available on the Alexa
Skills Store). In the context of a real-life Malexa, a responsible
disclosure would entail contacting Amazon and working with them
through the details of the MIM attack.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we introducedMalexa, Alexa’smalicious twin.Malexa’s
goal is to covertly manipulate the user’s perception on the content
delivered by an intelligent voice assistant. We showed how an at-
tacker, implementing the malware-induced misperception attack,
could turn Alexa into Malexa without the user’s knowledge. We
then tested Malexa in a study with 220 participants asking for their
perception on the government’s regulation performance based on
OSHA news briefings. Our findings show that Malexa is able to
make the government lookmuch less friendly to the working people
andmore in favor of big businesses. Malexa showed that "she" is able
to manipulate perceptions regardless of one’s political ideology or
how frequently one uses a voice assistant. Unlike visually inspected
text of Facebook or Twitter posts, text-to-speech voice provides
little cues for hearing inspection concerning whether trolling con-
tent is used or not. People readily welcome and undoubtedly trust
intelligent voice assistants and let them sit in their homes. While
people are concerned about what Alexa "listens to," little do they
pay attention to what is actually "spoken back to" them. If Facebook
and Twitter are gearing up to combat trolling in the next election
cycle, Malexa, as demonstrated in our study, provides a new avenue
for delivering trolling content directly into our homes. We hope
our results inform the security community about the implications
of having an alternative vector for any micro-targeted influence.
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